Despite these obvious faults, Das Zweites Buch does provide a significant functional value for a genuine historian. For starters, it provides one more proof that Adolf Hitler had a highly distorted and thus grossly inaccurate perception of both past and present. Which predictably led to colossal strategic blunders, defeat in the Second Great War, demise of the Third Reich, and Hitler’s suicide in the Führerbunker.
First, he got completely wrong the causes of the Great War and of German defeat on the Western front (it did win the war in the East). Hitler believed that the Great War was triggered by a mythical “international Jewry” and very real Britain while the real culprits were Serbia and Russia (not necessarily in that order).
He claimed that the Imperial Germany lost the war on the Western front because it was “stabbed in the back” by Jews and other traitors. In reality, it lost the war because its adversaries had (a) far superior resources after the USA entered the war; and (b) a better motivation both on the battlefield and at home.
And the final straw that “broke the back of the German camel” was, obviously, the betrayal of its allies in the beginning of November 1918.
Not surprisingly, his perception of the causes of November revolution in Germany was far off the mark as well. He believed that it was one of the results of a “global Jewish conspiracy” and subversive activities of the traitors while the reality was completely different.
By the beginning of November of 1919 the German society – top to bottom – came to an informal consensus that the German monarchy (a) got Germany into a deep hole and (b) is not capable of getting the nation out. Consequently, it had to be replaced with a radically different system – democratic republic.
His perceptions of the 1928 realities in Europe was not much better. Alliance with Italy was a very bad idea (possibly even suicidal) because it was a highly toxic liability and a highly questionable asset. So was Japan, by the way – another strategic blunder committed by Adolf Hitler (though not covered in this book).
Britain was a natural enemy, not a natural partner of Germany because the fundamental objective of British policy was to prevent any nation from becoming a dominant power in Europe (which would have been the inevitable result of German conquest of Russia).
Although France did want to return Germany to pre-Bismarck times (and even took some political steps in that direction), it had no appetite whatsoever to use military force (devastation caused by the Great War brought a complete aversion to any armed conflict).
The USA and Britain were natural allies, not enemies due to (1) uniquely strong cultural ties based on the common language and common history; and (2) their need for each other in their European and other endeavors.